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DICTA

The Layman and the Courtst
By JACK FOSTER *
As a newspaper reporter for a quarter century, I have sat before youor your colleagues on other federal benches--on many a grim and dramatic
occasion.
I have listened with awe, exhilaration and occasional cynicism to the
conclusions you have reached, to the decisions you have rendered.
But it never occurred to me that any one of you would ever be inter,
ested in hearing what I-the story teller for the multitudes, the casual reporter to the masses-would have to say. You rest so securely within the
shadow of the eagle, within the comforting arms of life-time appointments
that I had come to believe, I'm afraid, that your world was yours and mine
was mine, and never the twain could meet.
You are impregnable, I thought, within the rough-hewn castle of federal
law.
I as a newspaperman am a shifting mirror that catches the changing
colors of human life.
And so, with such different purposes in the world, I was frankly puzzled
when Judge Orie Philips invited me to speak before you gentlemen this
morning. I was puzzled because I could not see what I might have to say
would be of any value to you in the technical discussions of law and legal
procedure that are to follow.
And yet the more I thought about it the more I realized that unless
there is some bond between you, the federal judges, and me, the layman,
there is no law-and without law there is no America-and without America
there is, in this moment of history, no possible civilization assuring justice
to the individual.
We are gathered today within a few weeks of the anniversary of the
end of a great war. That war was fought between the forces of those who
believed that the right of the state is unquestional and those who declared

that the state is subservient to the will of the majority.
The latter forces-our dying sons and grieving daughters, our little
people from Tincup, Colo., from Okemah, Okla., from Pecos, N. M.,-won

that war. But will their victory be lasting?
There are many factors involved in the establishment of permanent

world peace.

But none of them is more important than the crystallization of

a strong America, and a strong America is not possible, in my opinion, with-

out a human interpretation of law and a human application of legal procedures.

t An address before a Conference of Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals at Santa Fe, New Mexico, July 22, 1946.
• Editor of The Rocky Mountain News, Denver.
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I do not pretend to know very much about law. But, like the gentleman who knows what he likes in art, I do know what gives me the ultimate
thrill in the slow unfolding of the democratic processes. That thrill comes
from watching an American jury in action. It comes from the realization
that there, sitting in twelve well-worn chairs, are the baker and mechanic,
the banker and housewife selected to judge the alleged offense of one of
their neighbors against their community and his.
These little folk-these people from our midst-were the true enemies
of Nazism and Facism. For they said, "We the multitude are capable of
judging ourselves and no power of superstate or mouthing dictator can ever
match our quiet strength."
But is the jury system-the bulwark of our Democratic life-functioning
as satisfactorily as it should? Are the members of the jury as conscious as
they should be of the overwhelming importance of their duty? Is the procedure for calling and picking a jury as smooth and efficient as it should be?
To get answers to these questions I talked with a number of gentlemen
in Denver who have served within the last few years on federal juries. And
I would like to tell you what they said.
There was the real estate broker. He is a busy man. He counts every
moment as a precious thing that should not be wasted by sitting around all
morning and perhaps all afternoon doing nothing. He felt that even if he
might be permitted to walk up and down the corridor or to call his office
occasionally, he would not get so restless. He felt that the judge was aloof
to his problems.
There was the eminent businessman. His life is one that moves by the
clock. He feels that there is an enormous amount of preventable waste of
time on jury service. He feels that somebody ought to be able to let him
know when there is the likelihood that a case will come to trial, and not
to call him until that time. He has been -on juries before, and he doesn't
think that the judge gives a tinker's dam about him.
There was the erstwhile electrician. He has served on juries repeatedly
and he likes it. He feels that he is performing an important function, and
he is invariably disappointed when he is dismissed before a jury is impanelled.
But he admits he has plenty of time on his hands, and he feels that a closer
check should be kept on the time of cases coming to trial for the bznefit of
busy men.
And then there was the laboratory assistant. He admits that there are
maddening delays in jury procedure. He admits that overcrowded court
facilities frequently make service distasteful. He admits that judges often
give the impression of being utterly indifferent to the proceedings. And yet
he declares he would be fearful of the possible results if jury selection were
placed on a rapid-fire cafeteria-style basis. He said:
"Yes, I dislike the delay. But still I think the slow, deliberate process
of jury selection leads to the greatest possible justice to the individual."
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I was talking with this gentleman in the company of a distinguished
Denver lawyer. At the beginning of his career this lawyer was serving as
deputy in the district attorney's office. He told a story of the fearful results that can follow over-hasty judicial procedure in capricious courts.
He was prosecuting a man a man who was accused of the rape of his
half-wit niece. Under pressure, the jury was completed sooner than expected. And the prosecution was without witnesses in the courtroom. So
the judge dismissed the case, thereby removing the defendant from jeopardy.
Shortly after this the defendant's brother-father of the niece-shot and
killed the defendant.
Said the lawyer:
"And then it was my job to try this man for murder-all because the
first trial was rushed too hurriedly."
There are those jurors, to be sure, who grow impatient with the slow
development of courtroom procedure. And in my opinion there is no
question about the fact that in instances this procedure can be speeded up
without jeopardizing the goal of justice.
In this connection I fervently regret that I was not able to hear the speech
by your distinguished colleague, Chief Justice Laws of the District of
Columbia. If my own talk had been better prepared and didn't need the
rewriting that frequently comes with re-reading in the cold light of dawn I
should have been able to have been here. Chief Justice Laws has earned
ardent distinction for his work as Chairman of the American Bar Association's subcommittee on Improving the Administration of Justice and I am
confident he touched extensively on the question of jury procedure improvement.
But perhaps he didn't enlarge on the human side of jury service. As a
newspaperman, it is difficult for me ever to separate a problem or institution
of any kind from its human aspect. That's the way we have to tell a storythrough people-if we wish our readers to understand it.
In 25 years as reporter and editor, I have talked with hundreds of jurors.
I have listened to their woes, have heard them express their fears, have
watched the troubled lines of regret cross their faces as the foreman handed
in a verdict of first-degree murder.
Many of them were serving unwillingly. They deplored their loss of
time and money.
Many of them had pleaded fervently to be excused-on real and, in
many cases, fictitious reasons.
Some of them, of course, were the more or less professional jurors who
are interested only in the excitement-and fee-of the particular case they
are hearing.
And yet I have found, from watching hundreds of jurors in action
over the years that, when they actually come down to the job of hearing a
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case, they are conscientious, solemn, deliberate and long-suffering citizens.
They realize fully the seriousness of the assignment as citizens that they
have. Despite the inept and incomplete discussion of the high importance
of jury service on the part of some judges, they seem to know that this is a
great and fundamental privilege of all Americans. And, as a rule, I have
found, they reach a decision that is a tolerant, reasonable, in keeping with
the average thinking of the community.
As laymen, they do not attempt to interpret the law.
They seek only, it seems to me, to offer justice to a fellow member of
the human race who they believe has as much right in the courtroom as
they do. They are not primarily concerned as to whether the prisoner before
them ought to be in jail. If he should be, they find him guilty. If they
think he shouldn't, they acquit. The issue is as simple as that in the mind
of the average juror.
In this connection, I am thinking about a case in federal district court
two years ago that absorbed my interest because of the uniqueness of the
charge. It was a case involving treason. It was a case in which three Japanese-American girls in a relocation camp in southern Colorado were charged
with treason and conspiracy to commit treason.
Ond of the distinguished gentlemen in this audience will remember the
case well. He tried the case. He had difficulty, as all of did, in pronouncing
the last name of the leader of the defendants. And so he resorted to referring to her by her nickname-Toots. It was, I assure you, a rare privilege
to hear a federal district judge from this bench of highest dignity refer to a
defendant as "Toots."
But, at any rate, these Japanese-American girls were accused of having
helped two German prisoners of war escape from a nearby prison camp. It
was clearly obvious to the jury that they were guilty. But it likewise was
obvious that they had helped these men escape out of bitterness, anger and
despair because they had been torn away from their California homes-not
in an effort to hinder our country's war effort.
So the jury found them innocent of treason and guilty of the lesser
charge of conspiracy to commit treason. It was a contradictory verdict, to
be sure, yet one that, in my opinion, was entirely within the thought of a
tolerant and reasonable community. To me this federal jury was carrying
out its responsibility in the highest sense of the word.
It was revealing in a practical way the truth of the phrase in one of the
reports of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, adopted in 1938, which you gentlemen will remember says:
"... trial by jury is the best means within our knowledge of keeping
the administration of justice in tune with the community."
But do the judges on the federal bench maintain, without exception, this
humanness that is an inseparable part of a jury. when it is functioning best.
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By their mannerisms in the courtroom, by their attitudes toward the jury,
the lawyers, the working press, do they carry across the essential idea that
the law, above all, is a human instrument, and they are human prophets of
this law?
Sometimes reluctantly I doubt it. Jurors and lawyers alike have recounted to me examples wherein it seemed to them that federal judges have
acted in an unnecessarily aloof, seemingly "better than thou" manner.
Just before I left Denver on the beautiful flight to Santa Fe I told a
friend that I was to speak before you gentlemen on "The Relation Between
the Federal Courts and the Layman."
He replied caustically: "Is there any?"
He was a newspaperman. He was thinking, I am sure, of a certain
rule that exists in the federal district court in Denver. At least it's annoying to us newspapermen-and I have wailed on occasion to my good
friend, the district judge, about it.
This court is only one of several types of offices and bureaus within a
large federal building. Several years ago, for some reason I do not know, the
federal district judge, now gone after years of faithful service to the highest
tribunal in the heavens, decreed that at least so far as newspaper photographs
were concerned the entire building came within his jurisdiction. No photographs of defendants might be taken anywhere in the building.
This rule has been perpetuated by the distinguished present district judge.
A short time ago the newspaper of which I am editor forgot this rule and
took a photograph in the marshal's office. This was during a recess of the
trial; it was far from the courtroom; the defendant had readily given her
consent. Yet we were threatened with contempt of court by our friend and
otherwise pains-takingly helpful district judge.
Personally I feel that in the event we had been cited for contempt and
had fought the case-as we certainly should have done-we would have
won. I personally believe that such citation for contempt on these grounds
would have been a violation of the constitutional guarantees to a free press.
But that is not the point. The point is there here again, in my humble and
perhaps prejudiced opinion, is an example of a federal judge holding himself unnecessarily far apart from the public and the press, assuming to himself what seems to me to be unnecessarily arbitary powers.
If the taking of this photograph had interfered with the processes of
obtaining justice, then, of course, contempt was involved. But if it hadn'tand, of course, it hadn't-then what reason was there for even the threat of
invoking this rule?
Yet I am, I like to believe, a human being myself, and if I were in the
position of authority that tradition gives a federal judge I am not sure that I
might make some rules of my own. There is, I suppose, by the very nature
of events, a greater aloofness on the part of the federal judge than there
is on the part of the state judge.
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The federal judge sits on the bench for life unless Congress removes him
for some flagrant offense. (And what federal judge could possibly wish to
disappoint Congress after their most commendable act of last Saturday?'
The state judge, of course, sits at the will of the electorate.
With such a setup, if I might use the word, you gentlemen are naturally
not as concerned with the cry of the multidude or the hue of the press as
you might otherwise be if the shadow of November were just ahead of you.
I am not saying that this is not a good thing. The necessity of pleading
with the public for votes every four or six years is a grim and debilitating
ordeal. I don't blame you for the rosy satisfaction that you must take out
of the knowledge that yours is a "til death do us part" marriage.
But when this satisfaction tends to blind you to the human factors
in the courtroom, as it conceivably can, then I think a great deal has been
lost. When this sense of security makes you inconsiderate of the none-toobright defendant-the annoying lawyer objecting with the force of a housefly, the blundering witness-when you brush aside these human irritations
with an arbitrary sweep of the hand, then the law suffers, I believe, immeasureably.
For the law must be human if it is to be a law of justice.
And the
interpreters of that law must be human and reasonable themselves if theyare to serve faithfully the ends of truth.
There are two possible kinds of law. The law of tyranny. And the
law of justice.
If the law becomes high-handed, arbitrary, oppressive, tyrannical, then it
breeds fear, distrust, confused resentment and subversiveness in the hearts of
the people. If, on the contrary, the law with high resolve dedicates itself to
the pursuit of justice-not revenge-to the search for a fair balance of human
truth-not punishment of its own sake-then the law becomes the great and
gleaming hope in a chaotic world to which the people can cling.
I am thinking of a little story of a simple person to illustrate this
fervent faith of mine. This was the prohibition era. An Italian woman had
been brought before a federal district judge for having sold some. wine.
She was a widow, the mother of five children. It was her second offense.
The district attorney, with all the majesty of revenge in his soul demanded that she be given the limit. But the federal judge, after listening
to his high murmurs of indignation, said:
"And so you are through. All right, sir, answer me this? If I should
give this woman a long sentence, who would care for her children? Who
would feed them? Who would clothe them? Who would give them even a
small chance to become constructive citizens in society? No, my dear sir,
my job is not to punish. My job is to render justice."
He gave this woman a meager sentence. And he was right. And the
public, who read the story in our newspaper, believed that he was right. And
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the law, through this simple act of granting justice to a little person, gained
new glory, I think, in the minds of our people.
Since I first accepted this assignment from Judge Phillips to speak before you, I have been thinking more profoundly than ever before about what
it seems to me is--or should be-the essence of law.
And I have been talking to myself, as men will, when they are struggling
to some conclusion. And I have been saying:
"Law is a measuring stick of conduct. It is the rule established by men
of good will to produce the greatest contentment to the greatest number in
a world that otherwise would have no order. But it is not an end unto itself. It is rather an expression of principles that change as history changes,
that shift as the need for mercy and charity increase.
"Brought into existence by the mind of man, the law has all of man's
frailties. Therefore, being strong in one generation and inadequate in another, as the races of men are, it must be subject to perpetually changing
interpretation. But, throughout these changes in interpretation, it must
always have as its indestructible goal the burning resolve that the lowliest of
man can come before it and be judged without prejudice, without malice,
without contempt. The law is-or should be-and must be-the unassailable faith of a free people who voluntarily have accepted these restraints so
that none of their number need go to the grave with the black belief that
life was set against him."
As a matter of fact, I have said to myself, the law should be interpreted
primarily to the ends that justice comes to the poor and lowly, the sick and
forsaken. The great do not need the law. They, by virtue of their wealth,
could be mercy unto themselves, could be judges without need for rules. It
is the lowly above all who need the warm, encircling arm of law-and for
them, and their rights as free born citizens, the law primarily should be concerned.
Fortunately judicial evolution has been in this direction during recent
years-certainly during the last quarter century. Over and over again the
Supreme Court has ruled that human rights are far more important than
property rights, and this point of view has spread through a great part of
the federal judiciary.
The Supreme Court, as spokesman for American justice, time and again
has concurred with the late Justice Brandeis in his eloquent expression of
faith that:
"The door of the court is not barred because the plaintiff has committed
a crime. The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as the most
virtuous fellow citizen; no record of crime, no matter how long, makes one
an outlaw."
Whenever there has been evidence that tortuous third-degree methods
have been employed, the Supreme has on most occasions, as you gentlemen
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know, ruled in behalf of the accused, even though he might by guilty. "The
wrack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand."
This was the view of the late Chief Justice Hughes. And in McNabb vs. the
U. S. you gentlemen will remember that the third degree was called by the
Supreme Court for what it is: "An easy but self-defeating way in which
brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection."
No, says the Supreme Court-the Wisconsin policeman who beat a confession out of a man, the Michigan officer who hung a skeleton in a room to
obtain a confession, the Florida authorities who chained a defendant overnight in a mosquito infested cell and questioned him the next day with the
scalp of a dead woman at his feet-no, these shall not rule the land, declares
our highest tribunal.
Furthermore, in searching for other examples of the defense of human
rights, I was amazed to find that the Supreme Court of the United States
during one war year issued 125 writs of certiori, calling for review of convictions of a relatively small band of people known as Jehovah's witnesses.
These cases sprang, as you gentlemen know, for the most part out of police
courts and involved only small fines. Yet the Supreme Court, which denied
to review matters involving millions of dollars in property, felt that the human rights of the individual must be defended at any cost.
Why am I citing these instances in a speech presumably about the relation between the layman and the courts? I am citing them as an affirmation
of my belief that a human court is the only fortress we've really got in the
everlasting struggle of mankind to maintain, as Justice Brandeis said, "the
right to be let alone." A human court, therefore, is the only true relation
that does exist between the people and the law.
Goodness knows, it is regrettable that personal differences among certain members have shaken the belief of some people in the integrity and
authority of the Supreme Court . Yet leaving all personalities aside, and
looking only at the record, this High Tribunal of ours has established in recent years examples of the application of principles of freedom for the individual for which, in my opinion, we shall be eternally grateful.
As this conversation with you comes to an end, let's look at a recent
case involving that strange and curious cult, the Great I Am. The leader
of the Great I Am came into the Supreme Court with a conviction for having accepted money for allegedly fraudulent revelations. But said Mr. Justice Jackson:
"The wrong of these, as I see it, is not in the money the victims part
with half so much as the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is
precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor,
for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we
must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."
A good deal of rubbish comes into your courts, I am certain, gentle-
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tlemen-much of it in the form of objectionable human beings. I am sure
that most of you wish that it had been cast aside somewhere along the way
before it got to you. And yet sometimes I think that the dignity and human
splendor of the law depend to a great extent on how the court disposes
of its rubbish. For it is through the handling of such cases that the court
has the opprotunity once again to state the human principles on which true
law flourishes-and in the restatement of these principles the judge is
brought closer to the layman, the layman closer to the judge.
And that is as it should be. For the layman and the judge are in reality
the same-they arei free people seeking, by tolerance and humanity and
wisdom, to keep-the law a true guide to fruitful lives during the few years
God has alloted us all.
Gentlemen, I realize I have spoken far longer and with less exactitude
than any newspaperman has a right to do. But do forgive me. For I
never expect to have the opportunity of speaking again out loud before a
distinguished gathering of federal judges-and I wanted to make the most
of it.

Colorado Small Estate Law
By A. A. CLEMENTS

*

There is a difference of opinion among members of the legal profession
as to whether the provisions of section 77, chapter 176, 1935 Colorado
Statutes Annotated, authorizes transfer of real estate of a decedent whose
estate does notexceed $300.00 in value. 1 1 have heard of no instance where
the legality of the transfer of personal property under this section has been
questioned. Some lawyers approve titles to real estate transferred under this
section; others disapprove. This situation creates a confusion which detracts
from the confidence of the public in the opinions of lawyers, and casts a
doubt upon the legality of real estate titles so transferred.
Section 77 reads as follows:
"In all cases where the estate of a decedent, or of a minor,
shall be of the value of $300.00 or less, the court may, upon verified application by a creditor, or person interested in the estate,
authorize the payment, transfer or delivery thereof in the case of
a decedent's estate, unto the surviving spouse, or other heirs, or
the creditors in the discretion of the court, and in the case of a
minor, to the natural guardian of the minor, if such there be,
otherwise to a next friend, appointed by the court, without the
* Judge of the Delta County Court.

Editor's note: Real Estate Title Standard No. 37 of the Denver Bar Association
reads, "Problem: Can Section 77, Chapter 176, C. S. A. 1935, with reference to
estates under $300.00 be used to transfer title to real estate?

Answer: No."

